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Abstract
Since the Inquiry on Modes of Existence has been long in coming and has connections with all the 
successive field works done by the author, the paper tries to retrace the main steps that have led 
to the project. It shows that it has preceded the work done in actor-network theory and explains 
the link between philosophy and anthropology through the peculiar notion of ‘mode of existence’.
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For a philosophy that is empirical and not simply empiricist, investigation offers the only 
way to ferret out its concepts and put them to the test before proposing a version that can 
be submitted to critique by one’s peers. And yet even though inquiry as a genre benefits 
from a distinguished and intimidating prestige in philosophy, it is fairly unusual for an 
author to propose to carry out an investigation with the participation of his readers. This 
is nevertheless what I propose to do in publishing a book titled An Inquiry into Modes of 
Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns (Latour, 2013) alongside a digital site that 
allows its visitors, who will have become coinvestigators, to inspect its arguments and go 
on to suggest other fields to study, other proofs, and other accounts. By means of this 
arrangement, I invite my coinvestigators to help me find the guiding thread of the experi-
ence by becoming attentive to several regimes of truth, which I call modes of existence, 
after the strange book by Étienne Souriau (2009 [1943]), recently republished, that fea-
tures this phrase in its title. This banal and quasi-ecological expression refers to a specific 
speech act – each with its peculiar felicity and infelicity conditions – to which is added 
the claim that a highly specific type of world is being inhabited. Souriau’s argument is 
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not to say that there are several ways to talk about one world but several ways for the 
worlds (in the plural) to be addressed.
The use of these modes is what allows me to offer the Moderns (what this term 
encompasses will of course have to be specified) a more realistic description than the 
one presenting the advent of Western reason or the one authorized by the critique of 
that same reason. My hypothesis is that each of these modes makes it possible to 
respect, in the empirical areas I have pursued up to now, a certain tonality in the experi-
ence, the felicity or infelicity conditions particular to each case, especially (here is 
where things become tricky) a specific ontology. In fact, each mode requires us to 
encounter distinct beings that must be addressed in their own languages. The classic 
question of philosophy, ‘What is the essence of technology, science, religion, and so 
on?’ then becomes, ‘What are the beings appropriate to technology, science, religion, 
and how have the Moderns tried to approach them?’ But how can the multiplication of 
these modes be justified when the civilization that one claims to be studying conceives 
of itself on the basis of only two categories, object and subject (though in many differ-
ent combinations, to be sure)?
When readers fail to understand why I have continually changed fields, and when 
they do not see the overall logic of my research – which leads them to look for my books 
in different aisles of bookstores (if they find them, i.e. if they look for them!) – their com-
ments amuse me, for I know of no other author who has so stubbornly pursued the same 
research project for 25 years, day after day, while filling up the same files in response to 
the same sets of questions. This is why it may be useful to explain how I arrived at such 
an unusual form of philosophical anthropology. Not to tell my life story – if a system is 
solid, one need not be overly concerned with its author – but rather to sketch the biogra-
phy of this argument on the basis of its history. No one can be astonished by the empirical 
birth of an empirical philosophy. In this article, I would like to pursue a contradictory 
exercise and recount the chaotic emergence of a systematic argument whose persistence 
over more than 30 years is surprising even to me.
If I am to go back to the past, the conscious past – I shall spare the reader the tribula-
tions of my unconscious – we shall have to begin with a convergence between Charles 
Péguy and Rudolf Bultmann. Every September, despite the harvest that was so important 
in the wine trade, my parents used to take me on a pilgrimage to Orléans for the annual 
Péguy fest. If I was deeply influenced by reading Péguy’s Clio (1961), it must have been 
because I conflated the lessons of Clio the muse, that great master of hermeneutic, with 
the meticulous, maniacal, and fertile scholarship of Biblical exegesis. From 1966 to 
1973, when I was a militant Catholic student at the University of Dijon, I had the good 
fortune to have as a philosophy professor André Malet, a Protestant minister and Rudolf 
Bultmann’s French translator (Bultmann, 1971). In his hands, which were as lustrous as 
parchment, the Biblical text finally became comprehensible, revealed as a lengthy pro-
cess of transformations, inventions, glosses, and diverse rationalizations, which, taken 
together, sketched out a layer of interpretations that played out – this is the essential point – 
each in its own way, the question of fidelity or treason: faithful or falsified invention, 
impious reworking, or astounding rediscovery? We spent hours outside of class compar-
ing the various resurrection narratives; for example, should they be read as informational 
stories (the tomb really is empty) or as transformational stories (the angel with a raised 
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finger makes it clear how the scriptures are to be read)? Moreover, how do such stories 
manage to resuscitate the person to whom they are addressed?
Because they escaped from an inexplicable form of transcendence and immobility, 
because they became localized, historical, situated, artificial – yes, invented and con-
stantly reinvented – and because they raised the question of their own veracity anew at 
every turn, these texts finally became active and accessible. The crushing responsibility 
of the reader invoked so marvelously in Clio was given a scholarly description by 
Bultmann. Strangely, to my eyes, the systematic deconstruction by exegesis of all dog-
matic certitudes, far from weakening the truth value that the successive glosses played 
out over and over, made it possible at last to raise the question of religious truth. But only 
on condition of acknowledging that there was an itinerary of veridiction with its own 
felicity conditions, an itinerary whose traces remain in exegesis and of which Péguy had 
tried to reproduce the disturbing tonality with his repetitive style at the turn of the 20th 
century.
In a thesis defended in 1975 and quickly given over to the biting critiques of dust 
mites, I had developed this argument in an analysis of Mark’s gospel and of ‘Saint’ 
Péguy (Latour, 1975). (I had added a third saint, the poet Saint-John Perse.) A bit of 
Derrida and Lévi-Strauss plus a large dose of Deleuze helped give the argument the con-
temporary sheen that neither Péguy nor Bultmann, of course, could have provided. 
According to my analysis, if the texts on the empty tomb did not convey information, 
they did something much more significant, by indicating the possibility of other regimes 
of veridical and above all verifiable speech (Latour, 1977). What is certain is that I 
emerged from that formative period armed with total but somewhat paradoxical confi-
dence about the fact that the more a layer of texts is interpreted, transformed, taken up 
anew, stitched back together, replayed, and rewoven, each time in a different way, the 
more likely it is to manifest the truth it contains – on condition (this is the part I retained 
for later use) that one knows how to distinguish it from a different mode of truth, pure 
and perfect information (which I did not yet call ‘Double-Click’, since computer mice 
had not yet arrived to tickle our fingers). A long struggle against the eradication of medi-
ations was about to begin.
Since it was still possible to escape from military service by engaging in ‘coopera-
tion’, a sort of French Peace Corps, I left the Gray lycée in Haute Saône behind and went 
to teach in the technical lycée in Abidjan. Imagine the brainwashing in store for a provin-
cial, bourgeois Catholic with an advanced degree in philosophy who finds himself trans-
ported into the cauldron of neocolonial Africa, with his wife and child, no less. In the 
Abidjan of 1973–1975, I discovered all at once the most predatory forms of capitalism, 
the methods of ethnography, and the puzzles of anthropology. One of them has never left 
me: why do we use the ideas of modernity, the modernizing frontier, and the contrast 
between modern and premodern, before we even apply to those who call themselves 
civilizers the same methods of investigation that we apply to the ‘others’ – those whom 
we claim, if not to civilize entirely, then at least to modernize a little?
By good fortune, the field study proposed to me by my colleagues at ORSTOM (now 
the Institute of Research for Development (IRD)) dealt with factories in the Ivory Coast 
and the impossible question of ‘Ivorizing’ the cadres: why did the expatriate bosses find 
no African cadres competent enough to replace them? I felt right away that if, to answer 
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this question, I were to use the schema of a struggle between modernization and archa-
ism, I would not be able to understand anything. But I realized at the same time that 
there was no alternative schema, since we did not know how to describe in ethnographic 
terms the meanings of ‘rational’, ‘effective’, ‘competent’, and ‘profitable’, all qualities, 
I was told with the scornful assurance of expatriates that seemed to be lacking in the 
African cadres. I saw clearly that these adjectives of combat and conquest did not result 
from any independent description; they were slogans, battle cries. If people hastened to 
invoke cultural dimensions, cognitive limits, ‘black souls’, and ‘African mentalities’, it 
was because their definitions for the work of thought were not sufficiently material and 
concrete. There was a flagrant asymmetry here: the Whites anthropologized the Blacks, 
yes, quite well, but they avoided anthropologizing themselves. Or they did so in a 
falsely distant, exoticizing fashion, by focusing on the most archaic aspects of their own 
society – communal festivals, belief in astrology, first communion meals – and not on 
what I was seeing with my own eyes, educated, it is true, by a collective reading of 
L’Anti-Oedipe (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972): industrial technologies, economization, 
‘development’, scientific reasoning, and so on: in other words, everything that makes 
up the structural heart of the expanding empires.
From this arose the idea of applying the methods of the social sciences, ethnography 
in particular, to the most modern practices. In 1975, California seemed to be at the fore-
front of humanity’s advancement, even described as its ‘target-tracking missile’. A scien-
tist friend from Dijon, Roger Guillemin (a cherished priest-uncle’s former altar boy!), 
had suggested that I join him at the newly established Salk Institute in San Diego, if I 
could come up with funding. It took me only a few pages to write up the project of an 
anthropology that would provide an ethnographically based description of those who call 
themselves rational and modern. I still remember the astonished look of the consular 
agent who was to rule on my Fulbright grant application when he heard my confident 
claim that I was going to make anthropology symmetrical at last! And yet I found it per-
fectly normal to embed comparative anthropology in a trajectory that led from Abidjan 
to San Diego by way of the ancient cobblestone streets of Beaune, traversing three forms 
of modernity as different from one another as possible. Destination: the United States. 
Field: a scientific laboratory. With the help of the journal I have been keeping since I was 
13, I sketched out in a few lines the project of comparing modes of truth, the first indica-
tion of a book that would appear only 40 years later.
Imagine my amazement when I discovered, in Guillemin’s laboratory in 1975, located 
in a splendid Louis Kahn building overlooking the Pacific Ocean, that scientific work 
bore a strange resemblance to the exegesis I had left behind in Burgundy. As a good eth-
nographer, I knew that I should be skeptical of the abstract notion of ideas floating in the 
air, but I did not imagine that following the ‘inscriptions’ (Derrida, 1967), all the ideogra-
phy of instruments, would provide such a fertile take on those ideas (Latour and De 
Noblet, 1985). And yet everything in the mysterious fabrication of facts became clear 
once I undertook to focus on the documents of the researchers in white lab coats who 
showed such interest – an interest that was at once totally obsessive and totally casual – 
and when I went on to follow the transformations of these documents step by step, it was 
as though the sciences could be embodied in fragile and apparently impalpable intellec-
tual technologies (Lynch and Woolgar, 1990). It is true that I was helped not only by 
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Derrida but also by François Dagognet, whose little book Écriture et iconographie (1974) 
put me on the right track: I followed it like a hunting dog, nostrils flaring.
How could that form of materiality have disappeared from epistemology as com-
pletely as Biblical exegesis had disappeared from the preaching of Catholic dogma? 
How could one explain that, here too, the appeal to an abusive transcendence had been 
able to dissimulate the layer of texts, of documents, that had to be continuously rewoven 
in order to produce a truth that could not be based, try as one might, on a firmer founda-
tion? Was it possible that scientific veridiction was as far away from Double-Click infor-
mation as the latter is from religious truth – in which case we would find ourselves faced 
with three types of veridiction, each entirely distinct from the others and true in its own 
genre and its own fashion?
In San Diego, I fell into the habit of bringing the smartest people I met around into the 
laboratory where I was spending 12 hours a day. I hoped they would shed their wisdom 
on the enigma of an anthropology of the sciences that I did not yet know how to decipher. 
This is where I met many of the main characters of the field of science studies that was 
being invented at the time through a crossover between Mertonian sociology of science, 
ethnomethodology, and the emerging Edinburgh school. Steve Woolgar, Harry Collins, 
Trevor Pinch, and Karin Knorr, all came to the Salk Institute, meeting some of ‘my’ sci-
entists together with the colleagues from nearby UC San Diego, such as Aaron Cicourel, 
Bud Mehan, and Joe Gusfield.
As luck would have it, just when I was asking my hopelessly difficult questions, I 
made the acquaintance of semiotics, thanks to Paolo Fabbri. I still recall my admiration 
when Fabbri, with his high-pitched voice and his lovely Italian accent, picked up a text 
that had emerged from the lab machinery – a text full of diagrams and chemical formulas 
concerning the discovery of a neuropeptide, the soon to be well-known Thyrotropin-
Releasing Factor (TRF) – and calmly set out to produce a Greimasian analysis of it, as if 
he were dealing with a fairy tale (Latour and Fabbri, 1977). In Paolo’s capable hands, the 
varied figuration of the actors was no longer to be confused with the underlying detec-
tion of the actants. I suddenly understood that the nonhuman characters had their own 
adventures that we could track, so long as we abandoned the illusion that they were 
ontologically different from the human characters. The only thing that counted was their 
agency, their power to act, and the diverse figurations they were given.
A world opened up then that I have not finished exploring and that lent itself admira-
bly, I have to say, to the principles of a comparative anthropology. Collectives – I did not 
yet have this word – were distinguished by the figuration they gave the actants, through 
the tests they had put their characters through, but not at all because some of these were 
realistic, rational, and real, and others symbolic, imagined, or mythical. The power of 
semiotics derived precisely from its sublime and radical indifference to the obvious real-
ism of subjects and social actors. I had found the ideal condition for tracing the inven-
tiveness of sciences that had been crushed by the task of mimicking the world, derailed 
by being so often confused with information about pitiful ‘matters of fact’ isolated from 
any ‘matters of concern’. Only the semiotics of scientific writings and inscriptions, freed 
from ordinary realism, could deploy this totally original mode of reference.
My excitement will not be hard to understand. I had a strong sense that this phenom-
enon, the circulation of scientific truth along chains of inscriptions, would not have an 
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easy time making a place for itself in philosophy because of the immense prestige of 
science. Since the path of inscriptions bypassed both knowing subjects and known 
objects, the mode of existence of scientific knowledge seemed to deserve a better habitat 
than the no-man’s-land between words and things. I had no idea that it would be neces-
sary to move heaven and earth to give it the place it warranted, and that, 40 years later, I 
would still be working at the task with pick and shovel.
The passion for semiotics – which cut its teeth as much on Biblical texts as on literary 
fiction – might have led to a simple ‘textualization’ of scholarly activity, if I had not 
discovered in Garfinkel’s (1967) research, around the same time, an entirely different 
way of breaking with the social realism that was so widespread in sociology (not know-
ing at the time that Mike Lynch was working along the same exact lines). The odd, jar-
gon-laden genius of ethnomethodology comes from the discovery that every course of 
action, even the most ordinary, is constantly interrupted by a minuscule hiatus that 
requires, from moment to moment, an inventive act of repossession by the actor equipped 
with his own micromethods. A clumsy lab worker myself, I unintentionally multiplied 
experiences of ‘breaching’ that revealed by contrast the hard-won competence of my 
comrades in the laboratory. I was put off by Garfinkel’s style, but I understood that he 
was proposing to do for all reports or accounts what I had already identified in religious 
exegesis and what I was discovering on the lab bench in the exegesis of scientific texts: 
no continuity of a course of action is possible without an inventive repossession that 
gives the social actor reflexive capabilities, sources of innovation, and even sociologies 
and ontologies whose uses go far beyond the capacities of ethnologists. The investigatee 
always knows a great deal more than the investigator.
This, moreover, is why I still found the philosophy of my youth so indispensable: it 
alone was untamed enough to manage to follow, without too much astonishment, the 
inventiveness of agents. It was through metaphysics that one could hope to become a 
good ethnographer. The idea that actors need no longer be viewed as ‘cultural dopes’ 
resonated marvelously with the actants deployed by semiotics. Happily, protected by my 
raw ignorance of sociology, I could not know that Garfinkel was going to remain as radi-
cally unassimilable by social scientists as Greimas was by epistemologists (Lynch, 
1985). Thus, nothing prevented me from using the terms ‘social’ and even ‘social con-
struction’ to describe the adventures of the nonhuman beings that were beginning to 
populate collectives (Latour and Woolgar, 1986). I had no way of knowing that it would 
take me a quarter of a century to get myself out of the misunderstanding created by the 
use of the word ‘social’ and from all the complications that turned out to be attached to 
it, to my great surprise (Latour, 2005). Although since my happy childhood in Beaune, I 
had not budged an inch from the most solid realism, and although we were the first to 
describe the materiality of the sciences with precision at long last, I suddenly found 
myself accused of an apparently abominable crime, committed inadvertently: calling 
scientific objectivity into question through ‘relativism’.
Back in France in 1977, looking for colleagues, I found myself on the premises of the 
Direction Générale de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique (DGRST) on the rue de 
Varenne, on the strength of the summary of a contract to study the evolution of biomo-
lecular chemistry in which the author, a certain Michel Callon from the École des Mines, 
calmly explained that he was not going to submit his analysis to preliminary checking by 
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chemists because he wanted to explore an approach that would be independent of scien-
tific authority. Ah! I was impatient to meet the bold fellow who professed to be talking 
about science with such freedom! Our meeting was a stroke of luck that ended up allow-
ing me to work for a quarter of a century in the tranquil bubble of the Center for the 
Sociology of Invention (CSI).
It was thanks to Michel Callon that I was introduced to industrial field studies. As we 
saw things, the technological arrangements we had to trace from the standpoint of inno-
vation (innovation was fashionable at the time, and money to study its origins was plenti-
ful) presented, as we saw it, a form of realism that the notions of efficiency or profitability 
could not exhaust. In the course of our investigations, we reconstructed the way engi-
neers had to design an entire world in order to succeed in maintaining their riskiest inno-
vations just a little longer. Here again, I fell upon a course of action that no continuity, no 
transport of necessity, and no somewhat solid causality could explain. But the hiatus 
peculiar to the new technologies – by definition, it is always a matter of breaking with 
existing practices through innovation – was astonishing because, in the end, when every-
thing was in place, when the arrangement was actually working, a detour had occurred 
through the intermediation of objects whose status became quite strange; these were the 
technological objects whose ‘mode of existence’ – this was the first time I had heard the 
term – had been proposed and explored by Gilbert Simondon (1958).
Just as sciences, grasped in their practice, could not be contained within the narrow 
framework of epistemology, neither could technologies, especially the most advanced, 
most modern ones, be contained within the simple idea of effective action on matter. 
They had to do with magic, religion, and philosophy; they had their own world, full of 
organizations, negotiations, calculations, metaphysics, and even morality; they repre-
sented a complete challenge to ethnographic or sociological description in that they upset 
the borders separating themselves from human subjects (Latour, 1988b). But in addition, 
and more radically, they populated the collective of nonhuman actors that brought to bear 
on the human actors, by delegation, as it were, a dizzying number of unanticipated con-
sequences, which we were so delighted in tracing with our colleagues in technology 
studies (Bijker et al., 1987). The technological infrastructure was, or so it seemed to 
Callon and John Law (1986), the most ‘social’ element in a given society, provided that 
we returned to the etymology of the adjective and enabled ourselves to follow all the 
associations required to extend the network, especially if we added to it the intellectual 
technologies that we had learned to follow by studying laboratories and that turned out 
to be mixed up everywhere with technological organizations (Callon, 1981). To machines, 
we had to add offices; to gears and cogs, we had to add accounting technologies; and to 
the resistance of materials, we had to add bureaus of standardization.
And yet in the eyes of our colleagues from the sciences legitimately called ‘social’, 
the social did not seem capable of absorbing the multiple and labile connections that we 
had designated by the word ‘translation’, purposefully borrowed from Michel Serres 
(Callon, 1986). We attended Serres’s seminar every Saturday, in the smoke-filled amphi-
theater in the Sorbonne (people smoked in classrooms then!), profiting every time from 
the boldness with which Serres developed his ‘anthropology of the sciences’ based on the 
very fertile principle of exegesis according to which the single metalanguage of a text – a 
poem, a fable, a memoir, or a scientific treatise, it hardly mattered – could always be 
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found in the text itself. All one had to do was look for it, a lovely methodological lesson 
for following the ‘actors themselves’ and an approach compatible with both semiotics 
and ethnomethodology. Describe, describe, and then describe some more. Explanations 
and contexts were much less important than connecting in a single tight interpretive net-
work – a text by Livy, an argument by René Girard, and a topological theorem. The 
explanation would come later, if there was time.
The discovery of technological detours and delegations added to my list a new mode 
whose ontology was very inadequately accounted for by the notion of ‘materiality’. I was 
beginning to wonder whether I might not have to change my philosophy, when I was 
lucky enough – always a matter of luck – to get a phone call from an anthropologist in 
California, with an invitation to attend the first colloquium for specialists in Papio anubis 
monkeys, which were beginning to be studied systematically. She needed an observer of 
controversies among scientists! Thirty-five years later, the shock of my encounter with 
Shirley Strum, along with primatology, ethnology, the Kenyan savannah, and, above all, 
monkeys, has not faded. I was to discover, first of all, that an intense social life – that of 
the baboon troops that Shirley had been following for 7 years and is still following in 
2012 – was perfectly compatible with an extremely limited use of technological tools 
(Strum, 1982).
While baboons manifest an unimagined degree of social complexity, wholly worthy 
of Garfinkel, they still use only their brains and their bodies. Here was something that 
offered a fine confirmation to the intuitions Callon, Law, and I had had about the tech-
nological fabrication of society: what characterizes humans is not the emergence of the 
social, but detours, translations, the enfolding of all courses of action into more and 
more complicated – but not necessarily more complex (Strum and Latour, 1987) –  
technological arrangements. A few months after I returned from fieldwork in Kenya, in 
1979, we drafted the foundational text of the actor–network theory (ANT), ‘Unscrewing 
the big Leviathan’ (Callon and Latour, 1981). The social theory it proposed was open 
enough to absorb the associations between humans and nonhumans – in particular, by 
making change of scale a consequence of using organizational as well as material tech-
nologies. The performativity of the social by the sciences, including the sciences of 
economics, legislation, and management, was thus opened more broadly to empirical 
research.
In shifting from the social to associations, the analyst benefited at last from as much 
freedom to maneuver as informants had; we could break out of the narrow framework of 
the ‘social dimension’ of scientific or technological phenomena whose content was pre-
sumed to escape the analyst entirely. The expanding sociotechnological networks were 
the ones to follow. We began to proclaim this from the rooftops, in a timely and untimely 
fashion. We must have been unbearable, but, after all, we were young and passionate, and 
besides, we were right! History – I mean the history that ecology was about to force 
humans and nonhumans to take into account – was about to prove this. Here, at least, no 
one could take us by surprise; equipment in hand, we were waiting for this new world or, 
to put it better, we were waiting for it like the servants in the Gospel, our lamps already lit.
And yet it was not the invention of the ‘sociology of translation’, as important as that 
may have been, that I retained from my long association with Strum and soon with her 
husband, David Western. No, the key discovery was the association in a single mode, one 
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totally surprising to me, of living organisms left to their own devices. I knew laboratories, 
of course; I was beginning to measure the artificial aspects of experiments – artificial in 
the good sense of the term; I knew perfectly well that there was nothing natural about the 
countryside (especially, the perfectly aligned vineyards of my native Côte d’Or), but how 
was I to qualify the space created by baboon troops that were being followed by research-
ers? Followed and not preceded by them, this says it all: how could I not be overwhelmed 
by these troops of monkeys whose path was crossed by leaping gazelles, by zebra or buf-
falo herds, and occasionally by a pachyderm slipping soundlessly by? No, this was not 
nature untamed, not the celebrated ‘wildlife’. Or rather, yes, it was all that, but it was 
something quite different as well: it was a segment in the trajectory of phenomena left to 
themselves, without the intimidating presence of human subjects. These later were pushed 
off into the wings. And yet these researchers capable of following and not dominating 
their object of study were producing science, and very good science at that (science I was 
assimilating as fast as I could by teaching a course with Shirley on the evolution of tech-
nologies and ecology at UC San Diego almost every year from 1979 to 1992). The various 
practices of primatology, from macaques tied down to chairs for torture sessions in labo-
ratories to chimpanzees imprisoned in zoos to baboons followed for a month at a time, day 
after day, by enthusiastic doctoral candidates, produced a magnificent lesson in philoso-
phy: it contained all possible postures of knowing subjects and known objects. The pas-
sion it inspired in Donna Haraway, whom I had the good fortune to meet in 1981, is 
understandable (Haraway, 1989). As we followed the baboons on foot, Shirley, as invisi-
ble in their midst as Athena at the heart of a battle, speaking softly, explained the astonish-
ing complexity of their societies to me even as she kept on taking notes. I began to imagine 
other relations between the course of knowledge and that of the known world. But to get 
there, I needed the opportunity to acquaint myself with ‘the other metaphysics’, that of 
William James and A.N. Whitehead.
At the time, I had no words to convey the impression made by my collaboration with 
Shirley and the ethnologists other than irreduction. This term had been the object of a 
little ‘politico-scientific tractatus’ – a curious philosophy without readers, a somewhat 
odd mix of network theory, then-current Nietzscheism, and an attack on epistemology, 
all this against the background of the Cold War (Latour, 1988c (published in French in 
1984)). It blended a spot-on intuition – the distinction between relations of power and 
relations of reason makes both reason and power incomprehensible – with a total contra-
diction unnoticed by me at the time, since I claimed to use the same metalanguage, in 
terms of translation, networks, and entelechies, for all associations. If I have always had 
a soft spot for this acerbic, youthful book, it is because I now know that it had to do with 
a particular mode of existence, and not, as I thought at the time, with an irreductionist 
philosophy – the mode that allows one to deploy networks of heterogeneous and unan-
ticipated associations without letting oneself be intimidated by distinct domains. I did 
well to demonstrate its effectiveness in a historico-semiotic study of the discoveries of 
the French national hero, Louis Pasteur. As a mode, network analysis is indispensable to 
investigation; I went on to show this once again in the delectable case of an automated 
subway system (Latour, 1996). But, like all modes, it tends toward hegemony and tends 
to misunderstand the others. Still, up to now, if someone had asked me, ‘What is your 
philosophy?’ I would not have known how to respond except by saying ‘Read 
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Irreductions’. (Not to worry: no one has ever asked me that question, since the tumultu-
ous quarrels over relativism and the science wars have in the meantime turned me into a 
mere sociologist, adherent of a ‘social construction’ according to which ‘everything is 
equal’, objective science and magic, superstition, and flying saucers.)
To understand how things finally came together, two other encounters have to be 
noted – one’s thinking seems to be a matter of decisive encounters whose effects one 
pursues in total solitude. (Without solitude, nothing happens; without encounters, noth-
ing happens either.) No sooner had I returned to Paris than Paolo Fabbri put me in touch 
with Françoise Bastide, an outstanding physiologist and semiotician with whom I had the 
great pleasure of working until her premature death in 1988. Françoise, with all the seri-
ousness of a single woman and a Protestant, applied to texts the same absolute respect 
that she had shown to study the countercurrent multiplier of kidneys when she was in a 
laboratory at the Collège de France. A specialist in and author of scientific texts, she thus 
knew very well that semiotics, despite its claim never to depart from texts, in practice 
actually never ceased to rely on what was happening outside them. The dilemma was to 
figure out how to approach this ‘outside’ without falling back on clichés about human 
subjects caught up in a social and material context. The intuitions of semiotics had to be 
extended beyond its original framework – Biblical texts and literary fictions – without 
sacrificing the independence of semiotics in relation to ordinary realism (Bastide, 1990, 
2001). Greimas, whose shiny pate tended to disappear behind the smoke produced dur-
ing his seminar, encouraged us in this project with a smile. (Cigarettes probably killed 
him, too, as they did Françoise.)
This is where we perfected a little piece of machinery based on the theory of enuncia-
tion. Fiction need not be too concerned about this: once an utterance has been produced 
within the frames of reference of a text – for it is almost always a question of texts – the 
itineraries of their actors (or better, their actants) are easy to follow. Yet this cannot be the 
case for at least two regimes of enunciation: scientific instruments and technological 
arrangements. For these, without question, the processes of shifting out have to be fol-
lowed with care. The nonfigurative characters in a scientific text may well travel like 
fictional beings, but they have to return in order to bring back something that finds itself 
in the hands of the enigmatic enunciator, the one whose presence is without importance 
in a fictional text, since no one asks Flaubert whether he really has Madame Bovary’s 
birth certificate, to show as a proof of his claims (Latour and Bastide, 1983). Einstein and 
his little relativist characters served as tests that allowed us to identify the weirdness of 
this fiction on the path to gradual verification (Latour, 1988a). But we had the most 
trouble with technological objects, because there we had to explode the textual frame-
work. And yet the problem was not materiality, but, here again, the particular role of the 
enunciator capable of absenting herself, since the object stayed in place without her.
In fact, as we soon noticed, the very possibility of the famous shifting out of levels of 
enunciation came from technology. The absence of a flesh-and-blood narrator in a fic-
tional narrative is not a semiotic property of fiction but of books as technological objects: 
without books, the narrator would be a storyteller as little absent from what he is uttering 
as the manipulator of marionettes in a bunraku performance. Françoise and I in fact had 
the idea that it would be possible to compare regimes of enunciation – this is the term I 
used at the time – by going from one to another by way of the attention paid to the 
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respective roles of sender, receiver, and utterance. In 1986, I drafted an initial text, AMI, 
for ‘Angel, Machine, Instrument’, using a common vocabulary to establish the compari-
son. (It took me only 26 years to get from AMI to AIME (An Inquiry into Modes of 
Existence)) Unfortunately, this project came to a halt with Françoise’s death, for she 
alone had the semiotic technology required to develop this model (Bastide, 2001).
If my readers have the impression that this new book on modes of existence comes in 
the wake of work in the sociology of science and technology, as if, after undertaking 
empirical studies, I had returned to philosophy at a more advanced age, this is simply an 
optical illusion. Science in Action, a book that I wrote in between these two phases, was 
published in 1987; at the very moment when I was writing up the investigation begun in 
1986 into the various regimes of veridiction. By following the circulation responsible for 
the production of facts and the construction of machines, one can read Science in Action 
not only as an application of ANT – which it undoubtedly is – but also as a detailed study 
of three regimes of truth: scientific reference, technological machinations and, opposed 
to both of them, the Evil Genius of Double-Click information. In fact, two distinct events 
occurred: on one hand, my encounter with Isabelle Stengers and, on the other hand, the 
unexpected success of the so-called ANT. This success and the ensuing disputes delayed 
the publication of the other project, although I continued to pursue it.
It is to Stengers, whom I had known since 1978, that I owe the constant disruptions 
that she imposed on all the social explanations – even those improved by the ANT – that 
Callon and I kept on producing. She challenged all my sociosemiotic developments with 
a vigorous ‘I know, I know, but even so ...’ and making a characteristic rapid circular 
movement with her right hand, demanded that something be brought to the surface in the 
analysis, something that would be the world but grasped differently. Even Pasteur’s 
microbes; even Aramis’s magnetic couplings, the automated subway system; and even 
Michel Callon’s famous scallops, all of them undeniably present, actants and movers, 
glittering with reality, still did not offer, in Stengers’ eyes, a sufficient guarantee that we 
had pulled ourselves away from the text, the social and the symbolic. To manage that, we 
would have had to grasp the world without dragging through its human subjects and their 
obsession with knowledge conceived as the relation between words and things.
I am almost certain that it was in 1987, during a conversation by the swimming pool 
at Fondation Les Treilles, in Provence, that Stengers shared with me an astonishing quo-
tation from Whitehead, who was even less well known at the time than Gabriel Tarde, 
about the risk taken by rocks – yes, rocks – in order to keep on existing; it must have been 
the famous passage about Cleopatra’s needle on the Charing Cross Embankment in The 
Concept of Nature (Whitehead, 1920: 165–166). In August of that year, stretched out in 
the sun on an island across from Gothenburg, in Sweden, I could not stop running my 
fingers over the rough red surface of the rocks as if to find out whether Whitehead could 
have been right! At that moment, everything – what I had discovered in Kenya and what 
the principle of irreduction had hinted at obscurely – became clear. There exists a com-
pletely autonomous mode of existence that is very inadequately encompassed by the 
notions of nature, material world, exteriority, and object. This world shares one crucial 
feature with all the others: the risk taken in order to keep on existing. Thus, the hiatus that 
I had detected very early on in exegesis and that I had found in the study of scientific 
inscriptions, in the disjointed itineraries of courses of action, and in the surprising detours 
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of technologies, the same hiatus was here as well, here in the first place, in the apparent 
continuity of being-here. An epiphany linked up with all the others, and especially the 
one whose scenario I had developed in Irreductions, when ‘for the first time, I saw things 
unreduced and set free’ (Latour, 1988c: 163). There was nothing inevitable, nothing 
definitive, and nothing irremediable in the tribulations of subject and object. One could 
think differently (Stengers, 2011).
From that starting point, everything quickly fell into place. In June 1988, when I got 
off the plane that had brought me to Melbourne for two precious months of total, blessed 
solitude, even in the fog of jet lag I was able to chart in one fell swoop the regimes that I 
was going to have to investigate more systematically (Latour, 1998). A few of the regimes 
or modes were still missing, but the essentials were in place, especially the principle of 
comparison on the basis of a metalanguage that has no goal but to keep ontological plu-
ralism from being crushed by the subject/object schema. In particular, the little frame-
work – call it semiotic, theoretical, philosophical, whatever – was no longer opposed to 
the deployment of fields of inquiry. I could be, without contradiction, a philosopher and 
an anthropologist and a sociologist: everything led to the investigation and everything 
stemmed from it. Here began the adventure that the readers of the book on modes of 
existence are invited to prolong today, by participating, if they so desire, in the research 
themselves.
Before I conclude, it may be useful to recall the influence of these studies on the 
nature/culture schema for philosophical anthropology. Not for a moment had I forgot 
the shock of Africa, of neocolonialism, and of the advance of the modernizing frontier. 
How can one practice a truly symmetrical anthropology? While I was in Melbourne, I 
prepared a lengthy review of Shapin and Schaffer’s seminal book on Hobbes and Boyle, 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), which had just been published. This led, thanks to 
the work on regimes of enunciation, to a significant outcome in symmetrical anthropol-
ogy: by providing a realistic description of the sciences at last, by showing their equip-
ment, and by bringing the chains of reference to the foreground, it became possible to 
detach the representation of Nature both from the work of the sciences and from the 
movement of beings left to themselves, a movement that Whitehead had taught me 
finally to respect. An anthropology of the Moderns became possible, one that would 
transform the nature/culture schema used up to then by anthropologists as an indispens-
able resource into a topic that had, on the contrary, to be explored. (Once again, ‘the 
resource becomes the topic’.)
The result was not negligible, for it made it possible to detect the immense abyss 
between the modernist representation of history – that of a modernizing frontier – and 
real history – that of an entanglement between humans and nonhumans that is ever more 
intimate and ever larger in scale. But above all, it opened up, with other collectives – a 
term I used from then on to replace the overly anthropocentric term ‘society’ – the pos-
sibility of making comparisons, at last, that would be less biased by the idea of a modern-
izing frontier capable, in the long run, of extending to the entire planet. The ‘others’ are 
not really modern? So much the better: we have never been modern, and they never will 
be. An entirely different history awaits us. Outlined in 1991 (Latour, 1993), the search for 
the parliament of things, 20 years later, has only increased in actuality. Modernize or 
ecologize: we were going to have to choose.
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As I saw it, the chief interest of We Have Never Been Modern, the negative version of 
an argument whose positive version I am offering now, is that it initiated a much closer 
collaboration with anthropologists, the genuine ones, around the ontological pluralism of 
collectives. It was no longer a matter, for Philippe Descola, or Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro, or Marylin Strathern, of comparing cultures against a background of Nature but 
of contrasting more and more sharply the ontologies of which just one, ours, uses the 
schema of mononaturalism and multiculturalism. Having been a servant of philosophy, 
anthropology is becoming, if not its mistress, at least its colleague; by becoming local or 
regional, ontology has become correspondingly deeper. For the science of being has 
more than one trick up its sleeve, it seems, and the end of the restrictions imposed by the 
notion of ‘symbolic representation of a material world’ opens up an all the more fertile 
program of research.
Between the science of being-as-being, the venerable discipline of ontology, and the 
science of being-as-other, anthropology, new bonds can be woven. All the more so in 
that the people Descola (2005) sees as naturalists, the Whites, frenzied users of the 
nature/cultures schema, in practice do something else entirely, which complicates their 
description a little bit more, as I see it. This is not insignificant, since the more and more 
pressing irruption of ecological questions requires us to pay closer and closer attention to 
the relations between cosmology and science. The singular term cosmology, a property 
of the exact sciences, and the plural term cosmologies, used in a somewhat casual fash-
ion by anthropologists to describe diverse worldviews, are now converging within an 
enclosure that has become the new political world, that of contemporary cosmopolitics 
(Stengers, 2010).
In the end, the mystery as to what these Moderns have been up to remains intact. What 
has happened to them? If it is not Nature that they have discovered through the fog of 
their cultures, if it is not Reason that has finally shined light into the darkness of repre-
sentations, what has in fact happened? Of what are they the heirs? To answer these ques-
tions of philosophical anthropology and of regional ontology, we need a method that 
provides an adequate depiction of the situations to be described. How many sensors are 
needed to do justice to the values deployed by the Moderns? I have been struggling to 
identify these sensors, in the hope that this brief return to the origins of my investigation 
will spur some readers of the modes of existence book to help me carry it out.
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